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The Compulsory Process Clause and the "Sporting
Theory of Justice": The Supreme Court Evens the
Score
Alfredo Garcia*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Over eight decades have elapsed since Roscoe Pound delivered
an iconoclastic address entitled "The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice"' to the twenty-ninth
annual meeting of the American Bar Association. A conspicuous
deficiency of our adversary system of adjudication, according to
Pound, derives from its inordinate emphasis on procedure to the
detriment of substantive justice.2 This stress on procedure results
in an adjudicatory process that resembles a game in which the primary objective is to ensure scrupulous adherence to procedural
rules rather than to achieve substantive justice. The outcome of
such a process, Pound maintained, is that our system of adversary
adjudication transforms the law into a "mere game"; as Pound eloquently put it, "[Our] sporting theory of justice awards new trials,
or reverses judgments, or sustains demurrers in the interest of regular play." 3
The theme Pound elaborated in that momentous address has
* Assistant Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law. B.A. Jacksonville
University; M.A. University of Florida; J.D. University of Florida. Professor Garcia formerly
served as Assistant State Attorney, Narcotics Division in Miami, Florida. He would like to
thank Mike Bloom, for his generous research assistance. "The author is also indebted to his
colleague, Ellen Podgor, for her assistance and helpful comments on earlier drafts."
1. Pound, The Causes of PopularDissatisfactionwith the Administration of Justice,
29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906).
2. Id. at 404-06.
3. Id. at 406.
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been echoed by legal scholars, particularly in the context of our
criminal justice system." Indeed, the resiliency of Pound's message,
which centered on the deleterious effects of our adversary system
of adjudication, 5 is evidenced by the spate of legal commentary on
the relative merits or disadvantages of the adversary process.6
The debate over the effectiveness of the adversary system as a
mechanism for arriving at the truth has gained considerable attention in the context of our criminal justice process. 7 A salient feature of that controversy focuses on whether procedural protections
accorded to criminal defendants impede the "search for truth" by
excluding probative, relevant evidence.8 The centerpiece of this
4. It should be pointed out that Pound limited his comments to the civil area, specifically excluding the criminal realm, because he thought the civil arena more worthy of concern. Id. at 396. For three examples of the application of Pound's theory to the criminal
process, see Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1440-43 (1985) (arguing
that the sporting theory gives the defendant an undue advantage); Grano, Miranda v. Arizona and the Legal Mind: Formalism's Triumph over Substance and Reason, 24 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 243, 267 (1986) (sporting theory as applied in Miranda leads to unwarranted formalism to the detriment of justice); Grano, Implementing the Objectives of ProceduralReform:
The Proposed Michigan Rules of Criminal Procedure-Part I, 32 WAYNE L. REV. 1007, 101922 (1986) (attacking the sporting theory of justice in the criminal context).
5. Pound explained that the adversary process undermined public confidence in the
legal system by fostering the skewed notion that procedure was a means toward evasion of
substantive justice. He noted that, "The effect of our contentious procedure is not only to
irritate parties, witnesses and jurors in parrticular cases, but to give the whole community a
false notion of the purpose and end of law. Hence comes, in large measure, the modern
American race to beat the law. If the law is a mere game, neither the players who take part
in it nor the public who witness it can be expected to yield to its spirit when their interests
are served by evading it." Pound, supra note 1, at 406.
6. See, e.g., Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional
Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29.; Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosauror Phoenix, 69 MINN.
L. REV. 1 (1984); Saltzburg, Lawyers, Clients, and the Adversary System, 37 MERCER L.
REV. 647 (1986); Steffen, Truth as Second Fiddle: Reevaluating the Place of Truth in the
Adversarial Trial Ensemble, 1988 UTAH L. REV. 799.; Sward, Values, Ideology, and the
Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L. J. 301 (1986); L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE
(1977); M. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE (1980); Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal
View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975); S. LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION
AND DEFENSE (1984).

7. Compare, e.g., Saltzburg, supra note 6 at 651 (arguing that "The American adversary system is misdescribed as a search for truth"); with Steffen, supra, note 6 at 803 (contending that "truth should be the reigning objective of every trial"). The specific application
of the adversary system to the criminal sphere has multiple facets; that is, a criminal trial
allegedly serves the varied objectives of finding the truth, producing a fair decision, protecting the defendant from possible governmental abuse, and generating norms accepted by the
public. These goals are not mutually exclusive; rather, they shade into one another. See
Goodpaster, On the Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 118, 121-44 (1987).
8. See, e.g., Grano, Miranda v. Arizona and the Legal Mind, supra note 4, at 276
("Under the dictates of Miranda's black letter formalism, we have thus reached a point in
our jurisprudence that judges feel constrained to suppress reliable statements even though
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controversy, of course, is the exclusionary rule, which affords criminal defendants the benefit of the suppression of otherwise relevant, material evidence as a remedy for the violation of protections
delineated in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.'
The rationale supporting the exclusionary remedy is grounded
upon three fundamental tenets: the interest in individual dignity,
the requirement of judicial integrity and the need to curb official
power. 10 Although the primary function of the exclusionary remedy
is to deter police misconduct, the ancillary purposes of the preservation of judicial integrity and of individual dignity are equally
compelling bases for the rule. The Supreme Court, however, has
completely discarded these rationales, maintaining that the sole
object of the rule is the deterrence of official misconduct.1 ' Furthermore, the Court has held that the rule is not mandated by the
Constitution, arguing that it is merely a "judicially created remedy" designed to achieve a deterrent effect instead of being a personal constitutional right of the party whose rights are violated. 2
Within the past decade and a half, the Court has significantly
narrowed the scope of the rule by employing a balancing approach
which weighs the costs of excluding material evidence against the
they acknowledge that the Miranda warnings in the particular context would be counterproductive in terms of everyone's interest and even though the statements obtained have
not been compelled.
...
). But see, Maclin, Constructing Fourth Amendment Principles
from the Government Perspective: Whose Amendment Is It, Anyway?, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
669 (1987) (the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment has resulted
in the diminution of rights afforded defendants pursuant to that amendment).
9. The rule was initially applied by the United States Supreme Court in the seminal
case of Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1913). In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961), the Court made the application of the rule a constitutional requirement. The rule
was invoked for a fourth amendment violation in Mapp. It was also applied with respect to
the Fifth Amendment initially in Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897) (Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination bars the use of involuntary confessions in
federal court) and also in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), in which the Court held
that any inculpatory or exculpatory statements in response to police questioning made by a
defendant in custody without the appropriate Miranda warnings and a proper waiver of the
Miranda rights is inadmissible. Id. at 444-45. The Court has also applied the rule with regard to the sixth amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237-39 (1967)
(excluding identification by witness because post-indictment lineup conducted without
counsel in violation of the sixth amendment); and Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201,
206-07 (1964) (excluding statements deliberately elicited by government agent after the defendant had been indicted and secured counsel).
10. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656, 659 (1961).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921 (1984).
12. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
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benefits derived from the application of the exclusionary remedy."3
Given the Court's restrictive interpretation of the purposes served
by the exclusionary rule, such a balancing test tips the scale in a
manner that clearly favors the admission of evidence gathered in
violation of a criminal defendant's constitutional rights. A corollary of this perspective is that it supposedly furthers "the public
interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes
the truth.""' Of course, such a view rests on the cornerstone of
Pound's critique of the "sporting theory" of justice: that is, that
the adjudicatory process should determine the outcome of a controversy on the substantive merits rather than on the slavish enforcement of procedural rules.
It is evident, therefore, that the exclusionary rule has come
under increasing negative scrutiny by the Court in recent years in
large part due to its "costs": that is, the rule excludes probative,
relevant, evidence. In Taylor v. Illinois,6 however, the Court excluded probative, material evidence offered by a defendant in a
criminal trial."6 Paradoxically, the Taylor decision relies heavily on
the integrity rationale, previously jettisoned by the Court as a basis for the exclusionary, rule, to support the exclusion of relevant,
probative evidence.17 The decision, moreover, portends an ominous
abridgment of a defendant's right to present a defense by administering the exclusionary remedy, previously applied only to vindicate an aggrieved defendant's constitutional rights, to prevent a
criminal defendant from offering exculpatory evidence.
In effect, the Taylor Court elevated procedure over substance,
thereby succumbing to'the "sporting theory" of justice. This Article argues that the Taylor decision reflects a result-oriented jurisprudence that decisively alters the balance of power in a criminal
trial by denying a defendant the right to present critical evidence.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), crafting a "good-faith" exception to the rule for evidence obtained by police officers relying on a search warrant later
determined to be lacking probable cause. The Court's reasoning was that the exclusionary
rule would not deter police misconduct under such circumstances. Id. at 920-21.
14. In holding that constitutional rights are personal and that the exclusionary rule is
not applicable to a party whose rights are not violated by public officials, the Court noted in
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), that: [W]e are not convinced that the additional benefits of extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify further
encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having
them convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth." Id. at 174-75.
15. 108 S.Ct. 646, reh'g denied 108 S.Ct 1283 (1988).
16. Id. at 655-56.
17. Id. at 656.
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The decision, moreover, is inconsistent with our adversary system
of adjudication and runs counter to precedent. Further, Taylor
flies in the face of the Court's previous derogation of reliability and
18
integrity as attributes worthy of constitutional concern.
The Taylor decision is grounded upon a strained construction of
the sixth amendment's Compulsory Process Clause.1 9 Therefore,
Part II of this Article delves into the historical background and
modern doctrinal basis of the clause. Part III will undertake a detailed critique and analysis of Taylor, emphasizing its departure
from precedent and its logically flawed analysis. In turn, Part IV
will juxtapose Taylor's premises with the Court's recent devaluation of the twin goals of integrity and reliability as values meriting
constitutional protection.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND MODERN BASIS
OF COMPULSORY PROCESS

A.

The Emergence of Compulsory Process

As the architect of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, James Madison included within its parameters the
right of the criminal defendant to obtain compulsory process of
witnesses in his favor.2" In comparison with other provisions of the
Bill of Rights, the sixth amendment was passed without major
modifications and with little controversy. 1 It is also apparent that
the provision of the sixth amendment. relating to compulsory process had gained wide acceptance at an early date in our history. As
the foremost authority on the Compulsory Process Clause persuasively demonstrates, by 1791 the right of compulsory process was
firmly entrenched within the American criminal process and "represented the culmination of the long-evolving principle that the
18. In Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 (1986), the Court did not object to the
admission of a presumptively unreliable confession. See part IV, infra. For a critique and
analysis of Connelly, see Garcia, Mental Sanity and Confessions: The Supreme Court's
New Version of the Old "Voluntariness" Standard, 21 AKRON L. REv. 275 (1988).
19. The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part that "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to... have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
20. Madison drafted all of the provisions incorporated in the sixth amendment with
the exception of the part dealing with trial in the state and district where the crime was
committed. See, e.g., Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REv. 76, n. 7
(1974) (citing J. GOEBEL, 1 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 430-31,
437-38, 442-43, 449, 455 (1971)); F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION

OF THE UNITED STATES 29-30 (1951).
21. See Westen, supra note 20, at 77; Heller, supra note 20, at 30-34.
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defendant should have a meaningful opportunity, at least on a par
with the prosecution, to present a case in his favor through
witnesses." 22
The vitality of the clause, moreover, was made clear in its forceful application less than two decades after the passage of the Bill
of Rights in the misdemeanor and treason trials of former Vice
President Aaron Burr. 23 A harbinger of the Burr decisions had
been provided by Justice Chase in United States v. Cooper.2 4 In
that case, the defendant was on trial for libeling the President and
he requested that the court issue a letter to members of Congress
imploring their attendance as witnesses on his behalf. Chase summarily denied the defendant's request, explaining that the defendant could rely on the Compulsory Process Clause. The clause, he
believed, applied to members of Congress, thus rendering superfluous the issuance of the letter since members of Congress could be
ordered to appear at trial.
Similarly, Justice Marshall concluded in the Burr cases that the
clause must be implemented even when the President of the
United States is the subject of its reach. 6 Marshall enshrined the
clause by asserting that "[T]he right given by this article must be
deemed sacred by courts, and the article should be so construed as
to be something more than a dead letter. ' 26 In placing such a high
value on the protections afforded by the right to compulsory process, Marshall rejected President Jefferson's interest in secrecy. Although recognizing the President's need for secrecy, Marshall remarked that such an interest must give way to the defendant's
'27 Of
need for information "absolutely necessary in [his] defense.
22. Westen, supra note 20, at 78, 79-101.
23. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (No. 14,692d) (C.C.D. Va. 1807); United States
v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 27 (No. 14,694) (C.C.D. Va. 18.07).
24. 4 Dall. (4 U.S.) 341 (Cir. Ct., D. Pa., 1800). Justice Chase, of course, was "riding
circuit" when he decided this case.
25. The compulsory process Burr sought revolved around two crucial letters that
formed the heart of the case against him. The letters allegedly exposed Burr's plot to create
a separate country under his control by invading Mexico and dissolving the states west of
the Alleghenies. These letters were allegedly in President Jefferson's possession, since he
had used them to inform Congress of Burr's plot and to establish Burr's supposed guilt in
the matter. As a result of Jefferson's message, Burr was arrested and bound over to a grand
jury in Richmond, Virginia. See Westen, supra note 20, at 102-03.
26. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 33.
27. Marshall noted that: "Perhaps the court ought to consider the reasons which
would induce the president to refuse to exhibit such a letter as conclusive on [the privilege],
unless such letter could be shown to be absolutely necessary in the defense. . .But on objections being made by the president to the production of a paper, the court would not
proceed further in the case without such an affivadit as would clearly shew the paper to be
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course, the claim of executive privilege would be pitted against the
demands of compulsory process over a century and a half later in
28
United States v. Nixon.
B.

The Modern Doctrinal Basis of Compulsory Process

Despite the forceful manner in which Marshall construed the
Compulsory Process Clause in the Burr case, the clause lay dormant for a considerable period of time, 9 until the Supreme Court
resurrected it in the landmark case of Washington v. Texas.3 0 In
light of the significance of the decision, and the Taylor Court's
flawed and incomplete application of Washington's doctrinal imperatives, it is worthwhile to examine in detail that seminal
decision.
The Washington Court gave new impetus to the right to compulsory process by equating it with the right to present a defense
and by characterizing compulsory process as a "fundamental element of due process of law."' 31 The Court thereby invalidated two
Texas statutes that prohibited persons charged or convicted as
coparticipants in the same crime from testifying for one another,
although the same restriction was not applicable to the prosecution.3 2 The factual predicate of Washington, therefore, must be examined in order to derive the doctrinal essence of the decision.
Jackie Washington was charged and convicted by a jury of murder. His defense rested on the contention that he did not shoot the
victim, but that he unsuccessfully attempted to dissuade the codefendant, Fuller, from shooting the victim. 33 The record clearly indicated that the codefendant would have been willing to testify at
Washington's trial and would have corroborated Washington's testimony. However, since Fuller had been previously convicted of the
murder, the Texas statutes precluded him from testifying on
essential to the . . .case." United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 192.
28. 418 U.S. 683, 709-13 (1974). See infra Part II B for a discussion of Nixon.
29. As Professor Westen notes, until 1967, the Supreme Court dealt with the clause on
five occasions, twice in dictum and three times in refusing to construe it. Westen, supra note
20, at 108. Those five cases were: Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 n.1 (1966); Blackmer v.
United States, 284 U.S. 421, 442 (1932); United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U.S. 169, 173
(1891); Ex parte Harding, 120 U.S. 782 (1887); United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361,
363-65) (1851), overruled in Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467 (1918). Id. n.164.
30. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
31. Id. at 19.
32. Id. at 22-23.
33. Id. at 15-16.
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Washington's behalf. 4
The Court first determined that the Compulsory Process Clause
was applicable to the states through the operation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.3 5 In arriving at this conclusion, the Court revitalized the right to compulsory process by
placing it on an equal footing with such other Sixth Amendment
guarantees as the right to confrontation, the assistance of counsel,
and the right to a speedy and public trial.3 6 In strong terms, the
Court defined the clause as implicating, "[tihe right to offer the
testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance . . .[and]
the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as
the prosecution's to the jury so that it may decide where the truth
lies.""7
The rationale undergirding the Washington decision is based on
the principle that our adversary system of adjudication values the
introduction of relevant, probative evidence over a court's "interest
in preventing perjury."3 8 In rejecting the reasoning behind the
Texas rule, namely that if alleged accomplices to a crime were permitted to testify for one another, "each would try to swear each
other out of the charge,"3 " the Court instead opted for a rationale
that placed trust on jurors to weigh the credibility of relevant testimony. Indeed, the Washington Court believed that if truth were
one of the fundamental goals of the adversary system, it was
"[m]ore likely to be arrived at by hearing the testimony of all persons of competent understanding who may seem to have knowledge of the facts involved in such a case, leaving the credit and
weight of such testimony to be determined by the jury or by the
court.

' 40

Given the Washington Court's emphasis on the need to present
relevant, crucial evidence to a jury, despite the risk that such testimony might be tainted, it was natural that the Court would find
the violation of Jackie Washington's right to compulsory process.
As the Court cogently put it:
34. Id. at 16-17.
35. Id. at 17-19.
36. Id. at 18.
37. Id. at 19.
38. Id. at 21-22.
39. Id. at 21 (quoting Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 335 (1892)).
40. Id. at 22. The Court quoted from Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918).
The Court also noted that even though Rosen was not constitutionally based, its logic was
required by the Sixth Amendment. Id.
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We hold that the petitioner in this case was denied his right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor because the State arbitrarily denied him the right to put on the stand a witness who was physically and mentally capable of testifying to events that he had personally
observed, and whose testimony would have been relevant and material to
his defense. The Framers of the Constitution did not intend to commit the
futile act of giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose testimony he had no right to use."

Implicit in the majority opinion is the notion that the defendant
ought to have an equal opportunity to present her version of
events, given the prosecution's inherent power to present its case.
To the degree that arbitrary rules designed to prevent perjury
forestall crucial witnesses from testifying for the defendant, the
ends of justice are not served. In essence, the Washington Court
nullified the Texas rules that prevented Fuller from testifying on
Washington's behalf by classifying them as arbitrary because'they
"[p]revent whole categories of defense witnesses from testifying on
the basis of a priori categories that presume them worthy of unbelief."42 Indeed, Justice Harlan's concurring opinion was premised
not on the Compulsory Process Clause but rather on the notion
that fairness dictated that the defense ought to have the same opportunity as the prosecution for presenting a coparticipant's crucial testimony.4
The principal teaching of Washington is that testimony on a
critical issue must be presented to the trier of fact even if the possibility exists that such testimony might be perjured." A by41. Id. at 23. The Court qualified its holding by asserting in a footnote that "Nothing
in this opinion should be construed as disapproving testimonial privileges. . . which are
based on entirely different considerations from those underlying the common law disqualifications for interest. Nor do we deal in this case with nonarbitrary state rules that disqualify
as witnesses persons who, because of mental infirmity or infancy, are incapable of observing
events or testifying about them." Id. n. 21.

42. Id. at 22. The Court correctly observed that the testimony of an accomplice who
testified for the prosecution had a greater likelihood of being perjured, since such an accomplice obviously had a tremendous inducement to lie. Id. Moreover, the majority exposed the
faulty logic of the statutes by stating that: "To think that criminals will lie to save their
fellows but not to obtain favors from the prosecution for themselves is indeed to clothe the
criminal class with more nobility than one might expect to find in the public at large." Id. at
22-23.
43. Id. at 24-25 (Harlan, J., concurring).

44. Id. at 21. In rejecting the justification for the Texas statutes disqualifying coparticipants of a crime from testifying for each other, the Court remarked that such rules
"[r]ested on the unstated premises that the right to present witnesses was subordinate to
the court's interest in preventing perjury, and that erroneous decisions were best avoided by
preventing the jury from hearing any testimony that might be perjured, even if it were the
only testimony available on a crucial issue." Id.
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product of this precept is that the finder of fact ought to be
trusted with the decision of ferreting out the relative weight and
credibility of testimony that is relevant and probative rather than
being shielded from such testimony because it might be tainted.
The Washington Court, in fact, quoted approvingly from Benson
v. United States45 for the proposition that the common law notion
that only disinterested parties should be allowed to testify ought to
be rejected. The reason for this common law rigid rule was that,
"[tihe courts were afraid to trust the intelligence of jurors."4' 6 In
effect, the Washington Court imade the clear choice that the presa criminal trial superseded a court's
entation of crucial evidence in,
interest in precluding a jury from hearing testimony that might be
perjured.
The main teaching of Washington was foreshadowed in Hoffa v.
United States. 7 In Hoffa, however, the principle was applied to
the prosecution rather than to the defendant. Hoffa's conviction
hinged on the testimony of a government informer whose credibility was subject to question. The defendant thus contended that the
prosecution's use of such an informer, who had a great motive to
lie, violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.4 8 The
Court agreed with Hoffa's argument that the informer had a great
incentive to lie. 49 Nevertheless, it rejected Hoffa's Due Process argument because the testimony of the informant was not ipso facto
untrue and because the built-in safeguards of the adversarial system, namely cross-examination and the ability of the jury to assess
the weight and credibility of the testimony, counterbalanced the
probability that the informers' testimony was perjured."
45. 146 U.S. 325 (1892).
46. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. at 21 (quoting from Benson v. United States, 146
U.S. at 336).
47. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
48. Id. at 310-11.
49. Id. at 311.
50. Id. at 311-12. It should be pointed out that the trial judge in Hoffa instructed the
jury on weighing the informer's testimony. The judge gave the following intruction to the
jury:
You should carefully scrutinize the testimony given and the circumstances under
which each witness has testified, and every matter in evidence which tends to indicate
whether the witness is worthy of belief. Consider each witness' intelligence, his motives, state of mind, his demeanor and manner while on the witness stand. Consider
also any relation each witness may bear to either side of the case. . . .All evidence of
a witness whose self-interest is shown from either benefits received, detriments suffered, threats or promises made, or any attitude of the witness which might tend to
prompt testimony either favorable or unfavorable to the accused should be considered with caution and weighed with care.
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The results of both Washington and Hoffa are in accord with
our adversarial system of adjudication, which places responsibility
on the fact-finder to determine the truthfulness and credibility of
witnesses. 1 This burden is shouldered by the fact-finder, in most
criminal cases the jury, because the parties in an adversarial system are primarily entrusted with the task of weakening their opponent's case through the impeachment of presumptively false or inconsistent evidence. In fact, the United States Supreme Court has
asserted that cross-examination is the most effective means of exposing false testimony. 52 The risk of admitting testimony that
might be false, therefore, is outweighed by the benefit of permitting the fact-finder to assess its weight and credibility assisted by
the inherent protections afforded by the adversarial system.
C. Application of Washington
The vigorous implementation of the right to compulsory process
in Washington continued unabated as the Court on several occasions in the 1970s applied, either directly or tangentially, the principal teachings of Washington. It is instructive, therefore, to analyze the decisions construing Washington. This examination is
necessary to counterpoise these decisions with the Court's misapplication of Washington in Taylor.
1. Cool v. United States
53
In a per curiam opinion, the Court in Cool v. United States
held that a defendant was deprived of his right to compulsory process when the trial court instructed the jury that the exculpatory
testimony of an accomplice should be disregarded unless the jury
deemed that such testimony was true beyond a reasonable doubt. 4
In applying Washington to the facts in Cool, the Court concluded
that such an instruction impermissibly infringed upon a criminal
defendant's right to compulsory process and violated Washington's
mandate because it excluded relevant evidence absent the jury's

Id. at 312 n.14.
51. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 440 (1976) (White, J., concurring);
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 35960 (1973); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 611 (1972); Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 311.
52. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965); Bronston, 409 U.S. at 358-60.
53. 409 U.S. 100 (1972).
54. Id. at 104.
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determination that the accomplice's testimony was "extremely
reliable.""
The Cool Court correctly construed Washington by emphasizing
the defendant's right to present exculpatory evidence over the trial
court's interest in preventing a jury from reaching a verdict based
on testimony that might be "tainted.""6 The Court thereby
stressed the primary teaching of Washington that in a criminal
trial the defendant's right to present relevant exculpatory evidence
takes precedence over the trial court's interest in preventing the
jury from hearing testimony that might be perjured. Implicitly, the
Cool Court also implemented the precept enunciated in Washington that the fact-finder should determine the weight and credibility of possibly false testimony rather than being preempted from
considering such testimony by the trial judge or, alternatively, by
instructions issued by the court.
It is also natural to draw the inference from the Cool decision
that the Court viewed the impermissible jury instruction as conflicting with Washington's prohibition against assuming that some
witnesses' testimonies are not worthy of belief. To the extent that
the trial court's instructions in Cool clearly suggested to the jury
that the accomplice's testimony was not credible, the message conveyed to the jury was unmistakable: that is, accomplices fit the category of witnesses who are a priori "suspect" and thus not
credible.
The second prong of the Cool decision relied on the fundamental
principle established by In re Winship 57 that the prosecution must
prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Through
its instruction on how to weigh the accomplice's testimony, the
trial court in essence "[created] an artificial barrier to the consideration of relevant defense testimony putatively credible by a preponderance of the evidence. . .[reducing] the level of proof neces55. Id. The trial judge issued the following instruction to the jury: "[I] charge you that
the testimony of an accomplice is competent evidence and it is for you to pass upon the
credibility thereof. If the testimony carries conviction and you are convinced it is true beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury should give it the same effect as you would to a witness
not in any respect implicated in the alleged crime and you are not only justified, but it is
your duty, not to throw this testimony out because it comes from a tainted source." Id. at
102 (emphasis added by the Court).
56. In effect, the trial court suggested to the jury that the accomplice's testimony was
not worthy of belief by stating in its instruction that the jury should not disregard the
testimony because it derived from a "tainted" source. Id. at 102.
57. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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sary for the Government to carry its burden."58 The upshot of the
trial judge's instruction was to require the defendant to prove his
innocence beyond a reasonable doubt, since the defendant's case
59
relied almost exclusively on the accomplice's testimony.
2.

Webb v. Texas

In a similar vein, the Court in Webb v. Texas 0 affirmed Washington's dictates, although it decided the case on Due Process
grounds rather than on the Compulsory Process Clause." In Webb
the defendant was prevented from presenting a witness when the
trial judge in effect intimidated the witness into not testifying. The
sole defense witness in Webb had a previous criminal record and
was serving a prison term when he was called by the defense.62 The
trial judge proceeded to issue a stern warning to the witness in
which he suggested that the witness could face perjury charges if
he testified for the defense." The witness did not testify, and the
defendant could not present a defense given the trial judge's successful effort in dissuading the witness from testifying."
The Webb Court quoted approvingly from Washington6 5 in
holding that the defendant's Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated by the judge's coercion of the defense witness.6 6 Specifically, the Court affirmed the proposition established by Washington that the defendant has a right to present
58. Cool, 409 U.S. at 104.
59. Id.
60. 409 U.S. 95 (1972) (per curiam).
61. Id. at 98.
62. Id. at 95.
63. Id. at 96. The judge told the witness:
If you take the witness stand and lie under oath, the Court will personally see that
your case goes to the grand jury and you will be indicted for perjury and the liklihood
[sic] is that you would get convicted of perjury and that it would be stacked onto
what you have already got, so that is the matter you have got to make up your mind
on. If you get on the witness stand and lie, it is probably going to mean several years
and at least more time that you are going to have to serve. It will also be held against
you in the penitentiary when you're up for parole and the Court wants you to thoroughly 'understand the chances you're taking by getting on that witness stand under
oath. You may tell the truth and if you do, that is all right, but if you lie you can get
into real trouble. The court wants you to know that. You don't owe anybody anything
to testify and it must be done freely and voluntarily and with the thorough understanding that you know the hazards you are taking.
Id.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id. at 98.
Id.
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a defense coextensive with the prosecution's right to present its
case and that the jury serves the function of determining "where
'6 7
the truth lies."
3.

Chambers v. Mississippi

In Chambers v. Mississippi,8 the Court again relied on the underlying premises of Washington while deciding that the defendant was denied Due Process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendant in that case was denied the right to present
the testimony of three witnesses who would have testified that
someone else committed the crime with which Chambers was
charged. 9 The trial court excluded this testimony on the basis that
it violated the hearsay rule.7" Noting that a defendant's right to
compulsory process is "essential to Due Process, ' 71 the Chambers
Court reasoned that the right of the defendant to present witnesses on his behalf, as set forth in Washington, Webb, and Oli73
ver,72 overrides the "mechanistic" application of the hearsay rule.
Although the Chambers majority acknowledged the need for evidentiary rules that ensure fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt, the Court nonetheless rejected the procrustean application of such rules to "defeat the ends of justice. ' 74 Chambers,
therefore, rejected the "sporting theory" of justice and instead favored a result grounded in substantive justice. In effect, the right
to present a defense triumphed over strict fealty to procedure.
4.

United States v. Nixon

The apotheosis of the Compulsory Process Clause in the 1970s
occurred when the Court issued its decision in United States v.
Nixon. 75 The Court harkened back to the basic postulate an67. Id. (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967)).
68. 410 U.S. 284 (1972).
69. Id. at 292-93.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 294.
72. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
73. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302.
74. Id. The hearsay evidence in this case bore assurances of trustworthiness since it
was corroborated by other evidence in the case: to wit, the confession of Gabe McDonald,
who Chambers claimed committed the crime, the testimony of eyewitnesses to the shooting
(Chambers was charged with murdering a policeman), testimony establishing that McDonald owned a revolver of the same caliber as the murder weapon, and testimony that McDonald was seen with a gun at the scene of the crime. Id. at 300.
75. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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nounced by Chief Justice Marshall in the Burr cases 76 that the
Compulsory Process Clause takes precedence over claims of executive privilege. Underscoring the importance of compulsory process
to the attainment of a correct result in a criminal trial, the majority noted that,"[t]o ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to
the function of the courts that compulsory process be available for
the production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or by
77
the defense."
More importantly, the Court stressed the constitutional aspect
of compulsory process, 7 noting that implicit in the notion of a fair
trial was the "constitutional need" that the outcome be based upon
the weighing of all relevant evidence. 79 The claim of executive privilege, therefore, had to give way to the "specific need for evidence
in a criminal trial." 8 0
If Nixon represents the culmination of the Court's expansive interpretation of the Compulsory Process Clause, a series of cases
dealing with the tension between the demands imposed by discovery rules and the right to compulsory process in the 1970s reflected
a certain ambivalence by the Court. Those cases did not resolve
the issue of whether discovery rules could, in certain instances,
take precedence over a criminal defendant's constitutional right to
compulsory process. A discussion and analysis of those cases will
be reserved and will constitute a backdrop to the discussion of
Taylor, since in that case the Court grappled with the question
posed by the conflict between discovery rules and the Compulsory
Process Clause. 8 '
D.

The Countertrend of the 1980s

The fidelity to Washington's dictates manifested in the robust
application of its fundamental premises waned with the advent of
the 1980s and concluded with the Court's apathy and, indeed, antipathy toward Washington in Taylor. The Court's decision in
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal 2 heralded the attenuation of
the expansive application of the Compulsory Process Clause that
76. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
77. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 709.
78. Id. at 711. The Court affirmed that: "The right to the production of all evidence in
a criminal trial similarly has constitutional dimensions."
79. Id. at 713.
80. Id. at 713.
81. See Part III A infra.
82. 458 U.S. 858 (1982).
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had prevailed the previous decade.
In signaling its retreat from Washington, the ValenzuelaBernal Court held that when the government deports witnesses
who may possess evidence relevant to the defense, such a procedure does not necessarily violate the Compulsory Process Clause
absent a showing that "[t]he evidence lost would be both material
and favorable to the defense."' 3 Moreover, the Court also evinced
its willingness to undertake a balancing approach in which governmental administrative considerations would be weighed against the
defendant's right to compulsory process.84
In Valenzuela-Bernal, the defendant was charged with knowing
transportation of an illegal alien into the United States. 5 He was
arrested at a Border Patrol checkpoint with three other passengers
of the car he drove. 6 Two of those passengers were deported to
Mexico on the determination by an Assistant United States Attorney that the passengers were not material witnesses either for the
prosecution or the defense.8 7 The defendant, who did not have an
opportunity to interview the two passengers before they were deported, maintained that the deportation violated his right to compulsory process pursuant to the Sixth Amendment and his right to
Due Process of law under the Fifth Amendment. 8
The reasoning adopted by the Valenzuela-Bernal Court was in
part based upon the administrative burdens shouldered by the
government as a result of not deporting aliens who "possess no material evidence relevant to a criminal trial."89 Giving free rein to
prosecutorial discretion,90 the majority deemed that the prosecution could be entrusted with the task of deciding whether a witness
was material and relevant to the defense. 1 The Court thus dimin83. Id. at 872-73.
84. Id. at 864-65.
85. Id. at 860. Specifically, the defendant was indicted for violating 8 U.S.C. § 1324
(a)(2), which prohibits the transportation of "any alien," "knowing that [the alien] is in the
United States in violation of law, and knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that
his last entry into the United States occurred less than three years prior" to the transportation or attempted transportation with which the person is charged. Id., n.1.
86. Id. at 861.
87. Id. A third passenger was detained to establish the defendant's violation of the
statute. Id.
88. Id. at 860-61.
89. Id. at 865.
90. The majority was concerned with restricting prosecutioral discretion to deport
aliens, noting that the "conceivable benefits" rule "significantly constrains the Government's prosecutorial discretion." Id. at 865.
91. The Court rejected as overly broad the "conceivable benefits" rule embodied in
United States v. Mendez-Rodriguez, 450 F.2d 1, (9th Cir. 1971), which found a constitu-
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ished the value of the right to compulsory process by counterbalancing the defendant's need for evidence with governmental, bureaucratic considerations.
The primary rationale of Valenzuela-Bernal rests on the dubious proposition that the defendant can depend on the prosecution
to determine the materiality of the evidence; and that the defendant bears the burden of proving, without any means of interviewing the witness, that the witness' testimony would have been material and favorable to the defense.92
Furthermore, the majority in Valenzuela-Bernal misconstrued
the core meaning of Washington by relying on a crabbed reading
of the case. The Valenzuela-Bernal Court quoted Washington to
support its holding that the defendant had not established that the
testimony of the deported witnesses would have been material, relevant, and vital to the defense.93 The majority noted that, "[i]n
Washington, this Court found a violation of the [Compulsory Process] Clause of the Sixth Amendment when the defendant was arbitrarily deprived of 'testimony [that] would have been relevant
and material, and . . . vital to the defense.' "I In essence, the
Valenzuela-Bernal Court not only quoted Washington out of context, but it also clearly missed the holding and the underlying message coveyed by Washington.
The clear holding of Washington is that the prosecution may not
arbitrarily deny a criminal defendant the right to "put on the
stand a witness who [is] physically and mentally capable of testifying to events that he [has] personally observed, and whose testimony [is] relevant and material to the defense." 95 It is discernible
that the word "vital" is conspicuously missing from the Court's
holding. Although the testimony excluded from Washington's trial
was vital, the Court's holding was not circumscribed to the facts of
Washington's case, but rather stands for the broad principle that
the Compulsory Process Clause protects a criminal defendant's
right to present any relevant and material evidence.
In fact, the majority in Valenzuela-Bernal was acutely aware of
tional violation when "the alien's testimony could conceivably benefit the defendant."
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 862 (1982). The majority in ValenzuelaBernal added that the adoption of the "conceivable benefits" test unduly restricted
prosecutorial discretion. Id. at 865.
92. Id. at 867.
93. Id.
94. Id. (emphasis added by the Court) (quoting from Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.
14, 16 (1967)).
95. Washington, 388 U.S. at 23.
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the fact that Washington did not provide a firm basis for its holding. Consequently, the Court resorted to Roviaro v. United
States 96 to bolster its rationale. In Roviaro, the Court held that the
government's interest in shielding an informant's identity must
yield to a criminal defendant's right to the informant's testimony.9 7 Although the Roviaro Court's holding was not constitutionally based, the Valenzuela-Bernal Court cited Roviaro for the
precept that "[wihile a defendant who has not had an opportunity
to interview a witness may face a difficult task in making a showing of materiality, the task is not an impossible one.''98
As Justice Brennan aptly pointed out in dissent, the
Valenzuela-Bernal Court's reliance on Roviaro is also misplaced. 9
Roviaro emphasized, according to Justice Brennan, the accused's
right to decide whether a witness might be helpful to the defense. 100 Accordingly, the Court in Valenzuela-Bernal should have
allowed the defendant, not the prosecution, the option of determining whether the illegal-alien eyewitnesses could have furnished
testimony material and favorable to his defense. 1 '
The Valenzuela-Bernal decision underscored the Court's deviation from the principles sustaining Washington. The ruling also
marked a disturbing trend in which governmental administrative
concerns are given equal, if not greater, weight than a criminal defendant's constitutional rights.'02 In effect, the Valenzuela-Bernal
Court bowed to the "sporting theory" of justice by allowing administrative reasons to play a role in determining a criminal defendant's right to present a defense. The ultimate glorification of the
"sporting theory" of justice and of procedure over substantive jus03
tice, however, occurred in Taylor v. Illinois.
96. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
97. Id. at 64-65. In Roviaro, the informer was the only witness, other than the defendant, to the crime (a drug sale). Id.
98. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 871.
99. Id. at 883-84 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 884.
101. Id. at 884-85.
102. See, e.g., Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987). In that case, the Court placed
emphasis on administrative considerations (i.e., the efficiency of a joint trial for the smooth
operation of the criminal justice system) in denying a criminal defendant the right to confront her accuser (that is, her codefendant). See Garcia, The Winding Path of Bruton v.
United States: A Case of DoctrinalInconsistency, 26 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 401, 420 (1988) for a
critique of Marsh.
103. 108 S.Ct. 646 (1988).
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TAYLOR V. ILLINOIS

In Taylor, the Court decided a question it had left unanswered
in both Williams v. Florida °4 and in Wardius v. Oregon 0 5 and on
which it had refused to grant certiorari on several prior occasions:10 ' that is, whether the Compulsory Process Clause prohibits
the exclusion of admissible evidence as a sanction to enforce discovery rules against criminal defendants. The Taylor Court answered the question negatively, thereby championing the "sporting
theory" of justice and detracting from the ideal of a criminal trial:
to seek justice and truth based on all of the relevant, material evidence available to the fact-finder. Moreover, the Court in Taylor
completely ignored the teachings of Washington and related
cases. ' 7 Before analyzing Taylor, however, it is necessary, as a
point of departure, to discuss its background.
A.

Discovery and the Compulsory Process Clause

08
In Williams v. Florida,1
the Court came to grips with the issue
of whether Florida's pretrial discovery rule requiring the defendant, in response to the prosecution's demand, to give notice of an
alibi defense. prior to trial was constitutional.'0 9 The Court held
that the rule was constitutional and hence not violative of the defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination because it did not compel him to reveal any information but merely
accelerated the timing of his disclosure." 0 More important for our
purposes, however, is the Court's discussion of the relationship between discovery rules and the defendant's right to compulsory process under the Sixth Amendment.

104. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
105. 412 U.S. 470, 479 (1973).
106. See, e.g., Taliafero v. Maryland, 461 U.S. 948 (1983); United States ex rel. Robinson v. McGinnis, 593 F. Supp. 175 (C.D. 11. 1984), aff'd, 753 F.2d 1078, cert. denied 471
U.S. 1116 (1985); Lane v. Enoch, 475 U.S. 1053 (1986); Smith v. Jago, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985)
(White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
107. See infra Section III C.
108. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
109. Id. at 79. Rule 1.200 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure provided that the
defendant, before trial, must furnish, upon a written request by the prosecution, notice of
her intent to rely on an alibi and to provide the prosecution with information of the place
she claimed to have been and with the names and addresses of witnesses she intends to use
at trial. The rule also required the prosecution to disclose to the defense the names of witnesses it intended to use to rebut the alibi. Id. at 80. The full text of the rule is published in
Williams, 399 U.S. at 104.
110. Id. at 85. The Williams Court also rejected the defendant's contention that the
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial mandates a twelve-person jury. Id. at 103.
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Noting that "the adversary system of trial is hardly an end in
itself," ' 1 the Court legitimized notice-of-alibi rules as consistent
with the search for truth and as congruent with the rational concern of the prosecution to prevent "eleventh hour" defenses based
on false testimony. 2 The Court, however, qualified its holding by
stressing that Florida's notice-of-alibi rule was "carefully hedged
with reciprocal duties requiring state disclosure to the
' 3
defendant."11
The Williams Court did not rule on the constitutionality of the
sanction imposed by the Florida notice-of-alibi rule because the
defendant complied with the rule. The sanction stipulated in the
rule involved the exclusion at trial of the defendant's alibi evidence, with the exception of his own testimony." 4 In a footnote,
the Court unequivocally stated that it was not deciding whether
the prosecution could enforce discovery rules against the defendant who failed to comply with such rules by excluding "probative,
relevant evidence."" 5
It is significant, moreover, that the Williams decision set forth
the appropriate solution to the problem notice-of-alibi rules are intended to protect against: unfair surprise to the prosecution. In the
event that a jurisdiction lacked a notice-of-alibi provision similar
to Florida's statute, the adequate resolution to the prejudice suffered by the prosecution is for the trial court to grant a continuance as soon as the alibi witness is called."' The continuance
would negate the strategic advantage sought by the defense because the prosecution would then have an opportunity to take the
deposition of or interview the alibi witness and thus discover rebuttal evidence.1 7 In fact, the Williams Court averred that such a
procedure would comport with the Constitution." 8 The Taylor
111. Id. at 82.
112. Id. at 81-82.
113. Id. at 81.
114. Id.at 80.
115. Id. at 83, n.14. The footnote, in its entirety, reads as follows:
We emphasize that this case does not involve the question of the validity of the
threatened sanction, had petitioner chosen not to comply with the notice-of-alibi rule.
Whether and to what extent a State can enforce discovery rules against a defendant
who fails to comply, by excluding relevant, probative evidence is a question raising
Sixth Amendment issues which we have no occasion to explore. Cf. Brief for Amicus
Curiae 17-26. It is enough that no such penalty was exacted here.

Id.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 85.
Id. at 86.
Id. at 85.
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Court, however, arbitrarily rejected this solution as a means of
remedying a discovery violation by the defense. 1 9
In contrast to the Court's approval of Florida's notice-of-alibi
rule, Oregon's alibi statute was found constitutionally deficient in
Wardius v. Oregon.120 The Court in Wardius held' that nonreciprocal alibi rules violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2 1 The defendant in Wardius was not permitted to
present an alibi defense at his trial either through a witness he
called or through his own testimony.'2 2
Once again, like the Williams Court, the Wardius Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of the preclusion sanction as
applied to the defendant in a criminal trial. The defendant in
Wardius contended that the exclusion of his testimony or that of
other defense witnesses at trial would be unconstitutional, even
conceding the validity of Oregon's notice-of-alibi rule. The Court,
however, did not decide the issue, arguing that the matter was rendered moot in light of the unconstitutionality of the Oregon
123
statute.
In an enlightening analysis of the purposes served by discovery
rules, the Wardius Court viewed such rules as helpful devices that
"by increasing the evidence available to both parties, [enhance] the
fairness of the adversary system."' 2 4 More important, the Court
grounded its decision on the essential premise that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required a "balance of
forces" between the prosecution and the defense. 2 ' The majority
emphasized the importance of discovery for the defense as well as
for the prosecution.' Indeed, the majority in Wardius clearly inti119. See Part III C infra.
120. 412 U.S. 470 (1972).
121. Id. at 472.
122. Id. at 472-73. The defendant called one witness to establish an alibi. When the
witness testified, the prosecution moved to strike the testimony on the grounds that the
defendant had not filed a notice of alibi. The trial judge granted the prosecution's request.
The defendant then attempted to bring forth the alibi through his testimony, but the prosecution objected and the trial judge excluded the evidence. Id.
123.. Id. at 472, n.4. The full text of the footnote is as follows:
Petitioner also argues that even if Oregon's notice-of-alibi statute were valid, it could
not be enforced by excluding either his own testimony or the testimony of supporting
witnesses at trial. But in light of our holding that Oregon's rule is facially invalid, we
express no view as to whether a valid rule could be so enforced (citation omitted).
Id.
124. Id. at 474.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 475. The Court observed that discovery is a "two-way street"-and that
"[tihe State may not insist that trials be run as a 'search for truth' so far as defense wit-
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mated that discovery rules should favor the defense given the superior advantages in resources the prosecution enjoys over the
defendant.1 2 7
In a trenchant concurring opinion, Justice Douglas elaborated on
the suggestion by the Wardius majority that discovery rules should
favor the defense. He assailed the development of discovery rules,
such as notice-of-alibi statutes, that compelled the defendant to
reveal information to the prosecution. The trial-related rights afforded criminal defendants in the Bill of Rights," 8 according to
Douglas, "[do] not envision an adversary proceeding between two
equal parties."1 2 9 Instead, those rights acknowledge the "awesome
power of indictment and the virtually limitless resources of government investigators."' 30 In essence, the rights enjoyed by the defendant under the United States Constution are "designed to redress the advantage that inheres in a government prosecution." '
Although both the Williams and the Wardius decisions deferred
resolution of the constitutionality of the preclusion sanction as a
remedy for a defendant's violation of a discovery rule, they suggest
that the Court would have been loath to uphold such a drastic
measure. The Williams Court outlined the pragmatic solution to
the problem by approving a continuance for the prosecution to
nullify any strategic advantage the defendant sought to gain by
"ambushing" the prosecution. Similarly, it is possible to infer from
the Wardius decision that the Court would have been reluctant to
augment the prosecution's decisive advantage over the defendant
by excluding relevant, material defense witnesses from testifying.
The Court's affirmation of the defendant's right to present a defense in Wardius was contrasted with the obligation of the defendant to make available all of her evidence to the prosecution in
United States v. Nobles.1 32 Nobles presented the issue of whether
the defense had the right to offer a selective portion of certain
facts, thus thwarting the prosecution's right to cross-examination.
nesses are concerned, while maintaining 'poker game' secrecy for its own witnesses." Id.
127. Id. at 475, n.9.
128. The rights encompass the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
Sixth Amendment rights to a trial by jury, to confront adverse witnesses, to Compulsory
Process for obtaining favorable evidence, to the assistance of counsel, and, of course, Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI and XIV, §

I.

129.
130.
131.
132.

Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 480 (1973)(Douglas, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
422 U.S. 225 (1975).
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The defendant in that case attempted to question the credibility of
prosecution witnesses through the use of the testimony of his investigator, who had interviewed the witnesses.133 The trial court
did not allow the investigator to testify, however, because the defense refused to disclose the written report of the investigator,
which summarized the interviews.
Upholding the trial court's exclusion of the investigator's testimony, the Court determined that the defendant's right to compulsory process was not implicated in the case because, "[t]he District
Court did not bar the investigator's testimony. . . [i]t merely prevented [defendant] from presenting to the jury a partial view of
the credibility issue. . . ."" The Court referred to the restriction
on the prosecution's opportunity to cross-examine the investigator
by remarking that "[t]he Sixth Amendment does not confer the
right to present testimony free from the legitimate demands of the
13 5
adversarial system.
The Nobles decision is crucial to our analysis because the majority in Taylor patently misconstrued its import.1 3 The Nobles
Court did not impose the exclusionary sanction, as the previous
discussion demonstrates; rather, it merely prevented the defendant
from presenting a partial view of the testimony free from the constraints imposed by cross-examination. The majority in Taylor,
however, would employ Nobles for the proposition that the exclusion of relevant, probative defense evidence is constitutionally permissible. 137 Such an application of Nobles is fundamentally
1 38
flawed.
B.

Prelude to Taylor: Crane, Ritchie, and Rock

Although the Court in Nobles did not undermine the key elements. of Washington and its progeny, it did intimate in
Valenzuela-Bernal that it was willing to dilute the protections em:139
bodied in Washington to accommodate governmental interests.
Nevertheless, the Court gave no hint immediately before the Tay133. Id. at 227-29.
134. Id. at 241.
135. Id.
136. For the majority's misapplication of Nobles, see Taylor v. Illinois, 108 S.Ct. 646,
654 (1988).
137. Id.
138. See Justice Brennan's dissent in Taylor, 108 S.Ct. 646, 661-62 (1988)(Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
139. See supra notes 82-103 and accompanying text.
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lor decision that it was willing to decimate the doctrinal underpinnings of Washington to the degree it did in Taylor. In fact, the
three rulings bearing on the Compulsory Process Clause rendered
by the Court prior to 'Taylorstrongly reasserted the basic rationale
underlying the defendant's right to compulsory process. It is instructive, therefore, to examine these three decisions as a basis of
comparison with the Taylor Court's distorted perspective of the
Compulsory Process Clause.
1. Crane v. Kentucky
In Crane v. Kentucky,"1 0 the Court held that a sixteen-year old
defendant was deprived of a fair trial when the trial court prohibited the admission of testimony relating to the circumstances
under which his confession was given to the police.' 4 The Court
cited the Sixth Amendment guarantees of Compulsory Process and
Confrontation, as well as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, for the proposition that the Constitution entitles the
defendant to "a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense." '42 Since the government's case relied almost exclusively on
the defendant's confession,'"" a unanimous Court concluded that
the opportunity to present a defense would be hollow indeed if the
"[s]tate were permitted to exclude competent, reliable evidence
bearing on the credibility of a confession when such evidence is
central to a defendant's claim of innocence."' 4 4
Not only did the Crane Court vigorously uphold the right of~a
criminal defendant to present a "complete" defense, but it also did
so when that right clashed with a state evidentiary rule. Though
the Court acknowledged the right of states to craft their evidentiary and trial procedural rules, it also recognized that, given the
factual predicate of Crane, the exclusion of testimony regarding
the circumstances of the defendant's confession did not afford him
a fair trial.'4 5
140. 476 U.S. 683 (1986).
141. Id. at 690.
142. Id. (citations omitted) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85
(1984).
143. Id. at 685. The defendant unsuccessfully attempted before trial to suppress the
confession. After the opening statement, during which defense counsel questioned the credibility and reliability of the confession, the prosecution convinced the trial court to prevent
any testimony about the circumstances surrounding the confession. Id. at 684-86.
144. Id. at 690.
145. Id. at 689-90. The Court noted that, "[W]ithout signaling any diminution in the
respect traditionally accorded to the States in the establishment and implementation of
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2.

Pennsylvania v. Ritchie

In the second case in which the Court had the opportunity of
addressing the scope of the Compulsory Process Clause, Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,'" a majority expounded a restricted view of the
Compulsory Process Clause; in effect, the Ritchie Court equated
the Compulsory Process Clause with the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, thus diminishing the status of the clause
4 7 The Court expressed this narrow
established by Washington.'
conception of the right to compulsory process by declining to "decide . . . whether and how the guarantees of the Compulsory Pro1 48
cess Clause differ from those of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 It
seems that the Ritchie Court conveniently ignored the fact that in
Washington the specific protections of the Compulsory Process
Clause were made applicable to the states through the operation of
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 4"
Nevertheless, the Ritchie Court in dicta reasserted the basic postulates of the Compulsory Process Clause. Referring to the precedent set forth in Washington, Chambers, Cool, and Webb, the
Court observed that criminal defendants have "the right to the
Government's assistance in compelling the attendance of favorable
witnesses at trial and the right to put before a jury evidence that
might influence the determination of guilt.""'5 Furthermore, the
Court in Ritchie affirmed a criminal defendant's right to discover
material exculpatory evidence even though such evidence is
shielded by a state evidentiary privilege. In Ritchie, the defendant
was charged with the rape of his thirteen year old daughter 5 ' and
attempted to discover records about his daughter kept by a state
agency that investigated children mistreatment cases. 52 Invoking a
state statute,'5 3 the prosecutor convinced the trial judge that the
their own criminal trial rules and procedures, we have little trouble concluding on the facts
of this case that the blanket exclusion of the proferred testimony about the circumstances of
petitioner's confession deprived him of a fair trial." Id. at 690 (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 404 U.S. 284, 302-03 (1973)).
146. 480 U.S. 39 (1986).
147. Id. at 56.
148. Id.
149. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
150. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1986).
151. Id. at 43.
152. Id.
153. A Pennsylvania statute provided that records of the Pennsylvania Children and
Youth Services were confidential subject to certain exceptions. One exception authorized
disclosure to a "court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to a court order." Id. at 44 n.2
(quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2215 (a) (5) (Purdon Supp. 1986) ).
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records the defendant sought were privileged.'
The Court held
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitled defendant to a review of the file by the trial court to determine whether it contained "information that probably would have
changed the outcome of the trial." '5
3. Rock v. Arkansas
The ambiguity concerning the appropriate boundaries of the
Compulsory Process Clause evident in Ritchie was dispelled by the
5
Court's decision in Rock v. Arkansas.'1
In Rock, the Court held
that an Arkansas evidentiary rule that per se excluded any testimony that was hypnotically refreshed contravened a criminal defendant's right to testify on her behalf.' 57 The Rock Court perceptively analyzed the issue it confronted as involving a dichotomy
between a state evidentiary rule designed to ensure reliabity in
fact-finding and the right of the defendant to present a defense by
offering material testimony.' 58
More importantly, the majority in Rock correctly interpreted the
major doctrinal underpinning of Washington: that evidentiary
rules based on the need for reliabity in the fact-finding process are
subservient to a criminal defendant's right to present a defense.15 9
In fact, the Court likened the statute at issue in Rock with the rule
6 0
of competence it declared unconstitutional in Washington.'
Moreover, the Court quoted Chambers v. Mississippi for the principle that a rule of evidence that prevents a criminal defendant
from presenting a complete defense by excluding material parts of
his testimony is constitutionally impermissible.' 6 '
The Rock Court recognized that the "right [of a criminal defendant] to present relevant evidence is not without limitation." '6 2
Nonetheless, the Court was careful to stress that restrictions on
154. Id.
155. Id. at 58.
156. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
157. Id. at 62.
158. Id. at 53. Citing Washington v. Texas, the majority noted that "[t]his is not the
first time this Court has faced a constitutional challenge to a state rule, designed to ensure
trustworthy evidence, that interfered with the ability of the defendant to offer testimony."
Id.
159. Id. at 53-55. It is significant that the Court quoted at length from Washington to
reaffirm this proposition.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 55.
162. Id.
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the defendant's right to testify must not "be arbitrary or dispro'
portionate to the purposes they are designed to serve." 168
Rather,
the Court proposed a delicate balancing approach in which the
burden rests with the state to justify an evidentiary rule that limits
' 164
a defendant's "constitutional right to testify.'
Moreover, the Court in Rock allayed concerns about the reliability of hypnotically refreshed testimony by pointing to the potent
weapon of cross-examination, which constitutes an "effective tool
for revealing inconsistencies.' 65 Therefore, the Court enunciated
the fundamental tenet expressed in Hoffa that cross-examination
in our adversary system of adjudication serves to bring to light the
truthfulness, or lack thereof, of a witness' testimony.' 6
Standing in stark contrast to the Rock Court's sound interpretation of the Compulsory Process Clause is the Court's egregious
misinterpretation of the clause as well as its disdainful indifference
to Washington's mandate in Taylor. The irony of the decision is
that the author of Rock, Justice Stevens, produced the diametrically opposed opinion in Taylor.
C.

Taylor v. Illinois

In Taylor, the Supreme Court allowed the preclusion of testimony by a defense witness as a sanction for a discovery violation
by the defense. 16 7 Unlike the situation in Washington, a rule of
68
competence did not disqualify the witness from testifying.1
Neither, for that matter, did a rule creating a privilege, such as the
rule in Roviaro protecting the identity of government informers,'6 9
nor the statute creating a privilege for certain juvenile records in
Ritchie,'70 pose an obstacle to the testimony the defendant sought
to present in Taylor. Rather, the testimony was excluded by the
trial court on the basis of a violation of a reciprocal discovery rule
which required the defendant, before trial, to reveal the names and
addresses of witnesses he intended to call.' 7 '
163. Id. at 55-56.
164. Id. at 56.
165. Id. at 61.
166. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
167. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 649.
168. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
171. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 649. The rule the defense violated is Illinois Sup.Ct. Rule
413(d), which provides in pertinent part that:
Subject to constitutional limitations and within a reasonable time after the filing of a
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Furthermore, unlike the notice-of-alibi statutes in Williams and
Wardius,7"2 whose primary goal was to prevent the likelihood of
fabricated testimony engendered by an alibi defense, the discovery
rule which the defense violated in Taylor was not chiefly designed
to prevent perjury through the means of an "eleventh hour" defense. Therefore, the Taylor Court applied the exclusionary sanction to otherwise relevant, admissible evidence merely for the violation of a discovery rule.
Given the foregoing analysis, it is imperative to scrutinize the
reasoning of Taylor and to critique its faulty logic. A starting point
for such an exercise is the factual predicate of the decision. Following an exposition of the facts, the Taylor decision will be analyzed
against the backdrop of the three fundamental premises of Washington v. Texas: that a defendant's right to present relevant, probative evidence outweighs a trial court's interest in preventing perjury; that, as a corollary to this principle, a jury ought to be
allowed to assess relevant testimony rather than being "protected"
from weighing the credibility of such testimony by exclusion of the
testimony; and that to the extent that evidentiary rules prevent
defense witnesses from testifying based on "a priori categories that
presume them worthy of unbelief," such rules violate the defend1 73
ant's right to compulsory process.

After undertaking an examination of Taylor from this vantage
point, the analysis will proceed to critique the part of the decision
that penalizes the defendant for the violations of discovery rules
committed by his defense counsel. 17 4 Finally, the last section will
deal with the impact of Taylor on the criminal adversarial process:
that is, the extent to which Taylor affects the balance of power in
a criminal trial and contradicts the fundamental premises of the
criminal justice system.
written motion by the State, defense counsel shall inform the State of any defenses
which he intends to make at a hearing or trial and shall furnish the State with the
following material and information withing his possession or control:
(i) the names and last known addresses of persons he intends to call as witnesses
together with their relevant written or recorded statements, including memoranda
reporting or summarizing their oral statements, any record of prior criminal convictions known to him. ..
Id. n.2 (emphasis added by the Court).
172. See supra notes 108-23 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
174. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 657.
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1. Facts
The defendant, Ray Taylor, was charged with and convicted (by
a jury) of the attempted murder of Jack Bridges.17 5 The conviction
rested on the testimony of Bridges, his brother and three other
witnesses. 76 These witnesses described an altercation that began
when Bridges slapped one Derrick Travis for sitting on Bridges'
car. Taylor came to the aid of Travis. 77 After a twenty-minute argument, Bridges left the scene "to cool off.' ' 78 Bridges apparently
did not "cool off" because he returned to the scene about an hour
9
later.'
Bridges testified at trial that when he returned to the scene with
his brother, Maurice Bethany, they were confronted by Taylor,
Travis, and several other individuals. Bridges testified that he fled,
but that Taylor pursued him and ultimately fired four shots at
Bridges, the last of which struck Bridges in the back. After he was
struck by the bullet, Bridges testified that Taylor pointed the gun
at his (Bridge's) head and pulled the trigger, but that the gun
misfired. 8 0
The altercation was supposedly Witnessed by twenty or thirty
bystanders. 8 Two of those eyewitnesses, Hattie and Regina Algood, who were sisters and friends of Taylor, testified for the defense. "82
' Their version of the event in question differed from the
prosecution's account in one significant respect: they testified that
Bridges's brother, not Taylor, had a gun and fired into the group,
hitting his brother by mistake. 8 '
Before trial, the prosecutor filed a discovery motion pursuant-to
Illinois rules that requires the defense to disclose the names and
addresses of witnesses it intends to call at trial.8 This was in accordance with Illinois Practice Rules, which provide for reciprocal
discovery in all felony criminal cases.' 85 Part of that reciprocal discovery includes a provision that requires the disclosure by both
sides, upon written motion by either the prosecution or defense, of
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 649.
Id.
People v. Taylor, 141 Ill. App. 3d 839, 842, 491 N.E. 2d 3, 5 (1986).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 649.
People v. Taylor, 141 Ill.
App. 3d 839, 842, 491 N.E. 2d 3, 5 (1986).
Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 649.
Id. See supra note 171 to see a partial text of the rule.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch ll0A, para. 411 (Smith-Hurd 1985).
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the names and addresses of all witnesses they intend to call at
trial.186

In the response to the prosecution's request, defense counsel in
Taylor provided the names of the two sisters who testified as well
as the names of two men who did not testify.187 He was permitted
to amend his answer on the first day of trial by adding the name of
two witnesses who did not testify. In fact, the only two witnesses
1 88
who testified for the defense at trial were the two sisters.
The source of the controversy arose on the second day of trial.
After the prosecution's two main witnesses completed their testimony, defense counsel sought to add the names of two witnesses to
his answer to discovery. One of those two witnesses was Alfred
Wormley, ls9 whose testimony the trial judge would ultimately exclude.1 90 To justify his addition of the two witnesses, defense counsel explained that "he had just been informed about them and that
they had probably seen the 'entire incident.',91
The trial judge questioned the late revelation of these two witnesses. Defense counsel explained that the defendant had informed
him of these witnesses in advance of the trial but maintained that
he had been unable to locate Wormley. 192 The judge was not satisfied with defense counsel's explanation, stating that the witnesses's
names could have been ,furnished to the prosecution, even though
their addresses were unknown. At that particular point in the trial,
the trial court then told defense counsel to produce the two new
witnesses the next day, at which point he would decide whether
they would testify. Further, the trial judge made the statement
that "witnesses are being found that really weren't there.

'1 93

186. Rule 412 obligates the State to disclose the names and addresses of its witnesses
upon written motion by the defense. Id. at para. 412 (a) (i). Rule 413 requires the defense to
reciprocate. Id. para. 413 (d) (i).
187. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 649.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 650.
191. Id. at 649.
192. Id. at 649-50.
193. Id. at 650. The judge told defense counsel:
There's all sorts of people on the scene, and all of these people should have been
disclosed before.
When you bring up these witnesses at the very last moment, there's always the
allegation and the thought process that witnesses are being found that really weren't
there. And it's a problem in these types of cases, and it should be-should have been
put on that sheet a long time ago.
At any rate, I'll worry about it tomorrow.
Id. n.6 (quoting appellate record at 13-14).
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The next day Wormley appeared in court, whereupon the trial
judge allowed defense counsel to make an offer of proof with
Wormley's testimony outside the jury's presence.1 9 Wormley testified that he had not witnessed the incident but that before the
altercation he saw Jack Bridges and his brother with two guns in a
blanket. Wormley also asserted that he heard Bridges and his
brother say "they were after Ray [Taylor] and the other people,"
and that prior to the incident he had run into Taylor and his group
'
and warned them "to watch out because they got weapons." 195
The prosecutor, on cross-examination, elicited from Wormley
that he first met the defendant (formally) two years after the incident occurred. He also admitted that defense counsel had visited
him at his home the week before the trial began. 196 At the end of
Wormley's testimony, the trial judge excluded Wormley's testi1 97
mony as a sanction for the discovery violation.
The trial judge's justification for excluding Wormley's testimony
is instructive because it strikes at the core of the Compulsory Process Clause and, specifically, at the precedent established by
Washington. The trial judge's reasons for excluding the testimony
were threefold: as a sanction for a "blatant" and "willful" violation
of discovery rules; to deter future violations of discovery rules because of previous discovery violations by other defense attorneys in
his courtroom; and because he seriously questioned the credibility
of Alfred Wormley. 198
It is also worthwhile to note that the trial judge chose to impose
the most drastic remedy for noncompliance provided by the Illi194. Id. The appellate record does not account for the fact that the second witness,
Pam Berkhalter, did not appear. Id. n.7.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. The judge's comments are reproduced in the Supreme Court's opinion. They
read as follows:
THE COURT: All right, I am going to deny Wormley an opportunity to testify
here. He is not going to testify. I find this is a blatant violation of the discovery rules,
(sic)willful violation of the rules. I also feel that defense attorneys have been violating
discovery in this courtroom in the last three or four cases blatantly and I am going to
put a stop to it and this is one way to do so.
Further, for whatever value it is, because this is a jury trial, I have a great deal of
doubt in my mind as to the veracity of this young man that testified as to whether he
was an eyewitness on the scene, sees guns that are wrapped up. He doesn't know Ray
but stops Ray.
At any rate, Mr. Wormley is not going to testify, (sic) be a witness in this
courtroom.
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nois discovery rules. 199 Illinois Practice Rule 415 stipulates the
penalties a trial judge may impose for violation of reciprocal discovery: the judge may order the noncomplying party to disclose the
withheld information; she may grant a continuance; she may exclude the undisclosed evidence; and finally, the trial judge may
enter whatever order she deems "just under the circumstances. "'20
The conclusion one may draw from a full reading of the remedies
provided by the rule is that exclusion is reserved for cases in which
the evidence remains "undisclosed." In the Taylor case, however,
the evidence was disclosed: Wormley was produced and testified
subject to cross-examination, though admittedly he was produced
late in the trial.
The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed Taylor's conviction,2"'
holding that exclusion of evidence was a permissible sanction for
the violation of discovery rules and leaving to the unfettered discretion of the trial judge the severity of the sanction imposed. The
court thus reasoned that the trial court in Taylor "was within its
discretion in refusing to allow the additional witnesses to testify."2 02 After the Illinois Supreme Court rejected Taylor's appeal,
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 0 3
2.

Reliability and Integrity vs. Compulsory Process

It utterly defies reason that the majority in Taylor 20 4 only refers
to Washington v. Texas once in the main body of the opinion. 0 5
The answer to the Taylor Court's glaring lack of reliance on Wash199. See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
200. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. ll0A, para. 415 (g) (i) (Smith-Hurd 1985).
201. 141 Il.App.3d 839, 491 N.E.2d 3 (1986).
202. Id. at 844-45, 491 N.E.2d at 7.
203. 479 U.S. 1063 (1987).
204. Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, and Scalia. Justice Brennan wrote the dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun. At the time Taylor was decided,
Justice's Powell replacement on the Court had not been confirmed.
205. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 652. The Court employs Washington to establish the proposition that the Compulsory Process Clause embraces the right to offer testimony and not
merely the empty right to subpoena witnesses. The Court therefore rejected the State of
Illinois' contention that the Compulsory Process Clause merely guarantees the right of the
defendant to subpoena witnesses. Id. at 651.The other references to Washington in the majority opinion are contained in footnote 1, in which Washington is cited for the proposition
that the Compulsory Process Clause is applicable to the states. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 649 n.1;
and in footnote 9 to resolve the issue of whether Taylor had preserved a constitutional issue
at the trial level because he only invoked a Due Process violation though he relied on Washington and Chambers to support his position. The Court concluded that such reliance on
the sixth amendment was "clear." Id. at 651 n.9.
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ington, however, is transparently evident. The Court did not emphasize Washington because it blithely ignored the basic postulates of the decision. In fact, the Taylor Court conveniently missed
the primary lesson of Washington: that the defendant's right to
present exculpatory evidence outweighs the court's interest in
preventing perjured or otherwise potentially unreliable testimony.
The rationale of the Taylor decision is predicated upon a balancing perspective that weighs the "fundamental" right of the defendant "to offer the testimony of witnesses in his favor" against
"countervailing public interests."20 6 Those competing "interests"
are the integrity of the adversary system, which depends on the
admissibility of reliable evidence and the rejection of unreliable evidence; the need for the "fair" and "efficient" administration of
justice; and the axiom that the ascertainment of truth is the ultimate objective of a trial.20 '
The linchpin of the Taylor decision is the Court's concern with
the values of reliability and integrity as indispensable to the operation of the criminal justice system. The Court rejected Taylor's
contention that the exclusion sanction should never override a
criminal defendant's right to compulsory process by claiming that
the public "has an interest in a full and truthful disclosure of critical facts"20 8 and that the central feature of the discovery rule at
issue in Taylor was "to minimize the risk that fabricated testimony
will be believed."2 0 9 At one juncture in Taylor the majority opinion
stresses that the trial court has a "vital interest in protecting the
trial process from the pollution of perjured testimony."2 1
Of course, this reasoning is at variance with the principal teaching of Washington. When the Washington Court invalidated the
Texas competence statute disqualifying accomplices from testifying for one another, it unmistakably rejected the logic behind the
rule. The underlying basis of the statute was to shield the jury
from hearing potentially perjured testimony. The Washington
Court repudiated such a rationale; in essence, it deemed the court's
interest in preventing perjury as subordinate to defendant's right
to compulsory process.2 1' Moreover, this fundamental axiom was
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 655.
Id.
Id. at 654.
Id. at 655.
Id. at 656-57.
See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
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applied to the prosecution in Hoffa v. United States.2" 2
Admittedly, one may raise the objection that the testimony
barred in Washington bore a certain indicia of reliability because
it was consistent with the defendant's testimony that the codefendant had fired the fatal shot that killed the victim.2 13 On the
other hand, Wormley's testimony in Taylor was regarded as "suspect" because he was identified by the defense at the "eleventh
hour." 4 However, if one examines the testimony of Wormley, it
does not seem as tainted as the Taylor Court implies.
Wormley testified that he saw the victim and his brother with
guns wrapped in a blanket prior to the altercation. 1 5 In response
to cross-examination by the prosecutor, Wormley admitted that he
had met Taylor four months before the trial, or over two years after the shooting occurred. Wormley also acknowledged during
cross-examination that defense counsel had visited him the week
before the trial began.2 16
Given this testimony, the likelihood that Wormley's testimony
was not reliable or was "polluted" by perjury is negligible. If
Wormley wanted to help Taylor by lying, he would not have admitted during cross-examination that he had not witnessed the
shooting. Nor, for that matter, is it likely that Wormley would
have acknowledged that he had formally known Taylor for four
months and that defense counsel had visited him before the trial.
Further, if Wormley would have been properly coached by defense
counsel, perhaps he would have verified the sisters' account who
testified on Taylor's behalf at trial. Finally, Wormley appears to
have had little incentive to lie for Taylor, since they had known
each other for a relatively short period of time. The bonds of
friendship did not seem to have solidified to the point of giving
Wormley a strong inducement to lie in Taylor's behalf.
Indeed, it is anomalous that the Taylor majority adopted the
trial court's reasoning that "witnesses are being found that weren't
2 17
there" to uphold the court's exclusion of Wormley's testimony.
In fact, Wormley admitted that "he wasn't there." Nevertheless,
his testimony was critical to the defense.
In fact, the crucial issue the Taylor majority chose to ignore was
212. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
214. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 655.
215. Id. at 650.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 657.
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the critical nature of Wormley's testimony for Taylor's defense. As
Justice Brennan aptly pointed out in dissent, the jury that convicted Taylor was "not permitted to hear evidence that would have
both have placed a gun in Bridges' brother hands and contradicted
the testimony of Bridges and his brother that they possessed no
weapons that evening.11 1 8 This testimony did not threaten the "integrity" of the criminal justice system, as the majority maintains.
Furthermore, Wormley's testimony was not cumulative or duplicative of the testimony of the other two defense witnesses. In effect, Wormley's testimony added a crucial ingredient to Taylor's
defense: it established that the victim might have been armed.
Moreover, the testimony was bolstered by the fact that Wormley
was, by all indications, a relatively disinterested party. As the Taylor Court observed, the sisters who testified on Taylor's behalf
were the defendant's "friends." 19 On the other hand, Wormley
could hardly be classified as Taylor's "friend" because they had
met a mere four months before the trial. Thus, Wormley's testimony would have corroborated the sisters' version of the incident
and served to exculpate Taylor.
Even if the stringent criterion applied in Valenzuela-Bernal was
employed by the Taylor Court, Wormley's testimony would not
have been excluded. Of course, in Valenzuela-Bernal the Court
stated that for the defendant to make a prima facie showing of a
violation of compulsory process, she must establish the evidence
was material and favorable to the defense.2 20 As the preceding discussion and analysis clearly indicates, the testimony excluded in
Taylor was material and favorable to the defense.
Wormley's testimony, moreover, suffered from no infirmity that
would have warranted its exclusion under evidentiary rules. It is
baffling that the Taylor Court, in rejecting the defendant's argument that the sixth amendment absolutely bars the exclusion of a
defense witness' testimony, raised the objection that a criminal defendant "does not have the unfettered right to offer testimony that
is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence." '2 1 As previously mentioned, however, the
testimony excluded in Taylor did not suffer from any of those deficiencies. 2 Rather, the only reason Wormley's testimony was ex218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 667 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 649.
See supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text.
Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 653.
See supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
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cluded was for the violation of the Illinois reciprocal discovery rule.
As a result of the trial court's exclusion of Wormley's testimony,
Taylor was prevented from presenting a "complete" defense. One
may contrast the Taylor ruling, therefore, with the Court's holding
in Crane v. Kentucky that the right to present a defense is superior to state evidentiary and procedural rules when such rules exclude competent, reliable evidence that supports a criminal defendant's claim of innocence.2 2 3
The Taylor majority upheld the trial court's exclusion of Wormley's vital testimony by rejecting Taylor's contentions that the
Compulsory Process Clause absolutely precludes the exclusion of
defense evidence as a sanction for the violation of a discovery rule;
and that even conceding the lack of an absolute preclusion of defense evidence, the exclusion of Wormley's testimony was inconsistent with the right to compulsory process.22 4
It is possible to argue, as Professor Westen has ably done, that a
criminal defendant has a constitutional right to introduce any material evidence, regardless of whether or not it is protected by an
evidentiary privelege.2 2 5 As Professor White reminds us, however,
such an approach might not be "pragmatic" in light of the current
make-up of the Supreme Court.2 26 Nonetheless, the defendant's
second argument, that is, that given the specific facts of Taylor the
preclusion of Wormley's testimony was constitutionally impermissible, is well-founded. It is worthwhile, therefore, to explore further
the justifications for such an argument.
The underlying rationale of Taylor's argument that the preclusion sanction was unnecessary in the context of his case rests on
the commonsense notion that less drastic alternatives than exclusion were available to the trial court. Indeed, the majority readily
acknowledged that Taylor was correct in making such an assumption.22 7 The Court recognized that such alternative sanctions as a
continuance, declaration of a mistrial, or disciplinary sanctions
against defense counsel could have minimized any harm to the
223. See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
224. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 651.
225. See Westen, supra note 20, at 161-77. See also United States v. Davis, 639 F.2d
239, 243 (5th Cir. 1981). The court in Davis held that "the Compulsory Process Clause of
the sixth amendment forbids the exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence solely as a sanction to enforce discovery rules or orders against defendants." Id. at 243.
226. White, Evidentiary Privileges and the Defendant's Constitutional Right to Introduce Evidence, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 377, 385-86 (1989).
227. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 654.
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prosecution.2 2 In effect, the prosecution suffered little harm in
Taylor because it was given the opportunity of cross-examining
Wormley. In fact, the prosecution was able to discover more evidence than it would have under the discovery rule Taylor's counsel
violated. 2 9 Under that rule, all the prosecution was entitled to discover before trial was the name of defense witnesses and any "relevant written or recorded statements." Admittedly, the prosecution
may have been "surprised" by the defense's "eleventh-hour" witness, but any disadvantage the state may have endured was redressed when it was given the chance of cross-examining Wormley
outside of the jury's presence.
Although the Taylor majority could not seriously rely on the argument that the prosecution suffered prejudice when Wormley was
produced the second day of trial, it resorted again to its primary
rationale: that the integrity of the adversary process required the
drastic sanction of exclusion to prevent potentially perjured or unreliable evidence from tainting the outcome of the trial.2 3 ° Of
course, as the preceding discussion has demonstrated, such a rationale is totally without foundation.
The proper solution to the trial court's problem in Taylor is suggested by the Court's discussion of the remedies available to cure
2 3 ' In that
unfair surprise to the prosecution in Williams v. Florida.
case the Court suggested the remedy of a continuance to negate
the strategic advantage sought by the defense when it failed to reveal an alibi witness prior to trial. 232 In this connection, moreover,
the Supreme Court of Mississippi has devised a solution that the
trial court in Taylor could have profitably employed.
In Houston v. State, 3 the Mississippi Supreme Court discussed
a procedure it has developed that reconciles the conflicting goals of
the utilization of relevant, admissible evidence and the imperative
of fairness to the party surprised by the late production of evidence or witnesses.2 34 The standard summarized and applied in
Houston directs the trial court to use a three-step procedure when
confronted with any discovery violation. The procedure entails the
following process: 1) upon objection by a party, the aggrieved party
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id. at 654-55.
See note 171 for the text of the rule.
Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 654-55.
See supra notes 116-119 and accompanying text.
Id.
531 So.2d 598 (Miss. 1988).
Id. at 611.
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should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to become familiar
with the undisclosed evidence; 2) if after this opportunity is offered, the objecting party still believes that it might suffer
prejudice, it must request a continuance (failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the party's objection to the evidence); and 3) if
the objecting party requests a continuance, the discovery violator
may choose to proceed with the trial and forgo the use of the undisclosed evidence (if, however, the discovery violator is not willing
to proceed without the evidence, the court must grant the re23 5
quested continuance).
Before the Taylor decision was rendered by the Court, in fact,
most state courts had followed the "less drastic" means approach
in dealing with discovery violations.236 Furthermore, as Justice
Blackmun's dissent in Taylor makes clear, the discovery rule at
issue in Taylor was merely a general reciprocal discovery rule and
did not involve the dangers normally associated with alibi defenses
that notice-of-alibi rules are designed to prevent. 37 As Justice
Brennan aptly put it in dissent, the harsh sanction of preclusion
imposed by the trial court and ratified by the majority of the Court
in Taylor, "distorts the truthseeking process by excluding material
evidence of innocence in a criminal case." 23 Furthermore, alternative sanctions "are not only adequate to correct and deter discovery violations but are far superior to the arbitrary and disproportionate penalty imposed by the preclusion sanction." ' 9
Finally, the majority opinion seems to find support for its hold235. Id. at 611-12. It is ironic that while the Houston case, decided after Taylor,
reserves the exclusion sanction for extreme cases, it cites Taylor for the incorrect proposition that the sanction should ought to be applied only in cases in which the defendant
(emphasis added) participates in some "cynical scheme to gain a substantial tactical advantage." Id. at 612. In Taylor, no evidence existed that the defendant participated in the decision to conceal Wormley's identity. See infra Part III C.4.
236. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.5 (1985).
237. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 667-68 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun joined
the dissent on the condition that it was confined to general reciprocal discovery rules and
did not take a position with regard to sanctions for noncompliance with notice-of-alibi rules.
Id. See also in this respect, Fendler v. Goldsmith, 728 F.2d 1181, 1190 n.19 (9th Cir. 1983)
(distinguishing in its analysis general discovery rules from the federal notice-of-alibi rule,
"which is a rule designed to deal with particular types of evidence").
238. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 658 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
239. Id. In reaching this conclusion, Justice Brennan relied on Rock v. Arkansas 483
U.S. 44, 55-56 (1987), for the proposition that the right to offer defense evidence can only be
limited to the degree such limitations serve "legitimate interests in the criminal trial process" and are not "arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve."
Id. at 660-61 (citations omitted). See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of this standard enunciated in Rock.
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ing in the "efficiency" rationale by noting that the state's interest
in an "orderly conduct of a criminal trial" warrants the invocation
of "firm" rules regarding the presentation of evidence.2"" It is indeed perplexing that the Court values administrative efficiency to
the extent of sacrificing a criminal defendant's right to present relevant, probative exculpatory evidence. This emphasis on "efficiency" and administrative concerns marks a disturbing trend by
the Court in which it resorts to this reasoning
to deny criminal
2
defendants vital sixth amendment rights. "
In sum, the Taylor Court's misguided emphasis on reliability
and integrity to sustain the exclusion of materially, relevant evidence resulted in a "distortion" of the truth and the concomitant
misapplication and denigration of the principal dictate of Washington v. Texas. The majority opinion, moreover, slighted the key
corollaries of Washington's mandate.
3. Is a Jury "Intelligent" Enough to Weigh Credibility?
One of the maxims the Washington opinion embodied is the
right of a criminal defendant to present exculpatory, relevant evidence to a jury despite the possibility that such evidence might be
perjured or otherwise unreliable.2 4 2 The Court thereby renounced
the assumptions of the common law rule that only disinterested
parties should be permitted to testify because the "intelligence of
jurors" could not be trusted. 4 3 As Justice Brennan's dissent incisively asserts, by allowing the exclusion of Wormley's testimony
because it was "presumably" unworthy of belief, the Taylor Court
"usurped" the jury's chief function in our adversary system: to
weigh the credibility of witnesses.""' Of course, such an arrogation
of the jury's function also contradicts the teachings of Rock v. Arkansas, as well as Washington v. Texas, that rules which preclude
a jury from hearing testimony because of its "presumptive unreliability" are constitutionally suspect. 245 .
240. Id. at 653.
241. The Court employed this rationale in Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987).
See Garcia, supra note 102, at 420 for a discussion of Marsh's implications. Furthermore,
the Valenzuela-Bernal Court also employed this reasoning to bolster its holding. See supra
notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 33-44 and accompanying text.
243. Washington, 388 U.S. at 21 (quoting from Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325,
336 (1892)). See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
244. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 663, n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
245. Id. For a discussion of Rock regarding this issue see supra notes 156-166 and
accompanying text.
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In our adversary system of adjudication, of course, the benefits
of cross-examination serve as a bulwark to ferret out false or unreliable testimony. Therefore, in Taylor, had the trial court permitted Wormley's testimony, the prosecutor could have effectively
brought out any inconsistencies and discovered the "real" story
during cross-examination. In fact, the prosecutor accomplished this
task when he cross-examined Wormley outside of the jury's presence. 246 Instead, the jury's "intelligence" was called into question
when the trial judge deprived it of the right to hear and assess the
weight and credibility of Wormley's testimony. 41
4.

A Priori Categories and Compulsory Process

Closely connected with the principle that the jury ought to determine the credibility of relevant, probative, and otherwise admissible evidence is Washington's holding that evidentiary rules
designed to curtail perjury by precluding defense witnesses from
testifying violate the Compulsory Process Clause.2 4 Of course,
those rules are based on the notion that certain categories of defense witnesses are presumptively not worthy of belief.24 9 In effect,
as Justice Brennan argues, the majority in Taylor ratified the concept repudiated in Washington by implying that a defense witness
who is not identified until the trial has begun is presumptively unworthy of belief and thus should be barred from testifying.2 5 °
Futhermore, the majority's exclusion of Wormley's testimony in
Taylor contravenes the dictates of Chambers and Rock, which
sanctioned the introduction of reliable hearsay statements as well
as a defendant's post-hypnosis testimony despite evidentiary rules
to the contrary.2 5 ' The proper course the trial court should have
followed in Taylor would have been to admit Wormley's testimony
but to have permitted the prosecutor to comment on the defense's
late disclosure of Wormley. 52 Rather than pursuing this sensible
246. See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
247. According to Justice Brennan's dissent, the trial judge in Taylor did not exclude
Wormley's testimony solely on its apparent lack of credibility because Illinois law forbade
exclusion of testimony based on lack of credibility. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 662 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted). On a reading of the appellate record, Justice Brennan concluded that the trial court excluded the testimony because of defense counsel's misrepresentation to the court as to when he had located Wormley. Id. at 664.
248. Washington, 388 U.S. at 22.
249. Id.
250. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 663 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
251. Id.
252. Id. The defendant conceded this point on appeal. Id.

1990

The Compulsory Process Clause

approach to the problem, however, the trial court indulged in the
presumption of unbelief that Washington and its progeny repudiated. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court endorsed the trial court's
arbitrary preclusion of Wormley's testimony.
5.

Visit the Sins of the Lawyer on the Client?

An intriguing part of the Taylor decision is the majority's rejection of Taylor's contention that his constitutional right to compulsory process should not be curtailed because of an ethical violation
by his counsel.25 3 The majority's response to this argument is disingenuous and utterly lacking in logic. In essence, the majority's
argument is that a criminal defendant is bound by the tactical decisions of his attorney because the lawyer must have "full authority to manage the conduct of the trial."'2 54 The efficiency rationale
again rears its ugly head, as the Court maintains that "the adversary process could not function effectively if every tactical decision
required client approval."2 55
As Justice Brennan argued in dissent, this argument presupposes that one may categorize defense counsel's conduct in failing
to identify Wormley as "tactical" in nature. An attorney does not
have the freedom of engaging in conduct that "includes misconduct as an option. 2 56 Moreover, the Court's perspective leads to a
conflict of interest between the defendant and counsel. Justice
Brennan observed that defense counsel in Taylor became less than
zealous when the trial judge threatened to expose his actions to the
bar disciplinary commission.25 7 In a case where a willful discovery
violation by defense counsel occurs, therefore, it is unrealistic to
expect that defense counsel will protect his client's interests when
those interests clash with counsel's professional reputation.5 '
More importantly, the majority's position in this respect significantly abridges a criminal defendant's personal constitutional
right to compulsory process and to a complete and effective defense as a sanction for her counsel's violation of a procedural rule
and for her attorney's possible violation of the professional code of
253. Id. at 657.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 666 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 667.
258. Id. As Justice Brennan succinctly put it, "I cannot see how we can expect defense
counsel in this or any other case to act as vigorous advocates for the interests of their clients
when those interests are adverse to their own." Id.
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ethics. If we accept Justice Brennan's conclusion that the trial
court excluded Wormley's crucial testimony to punish defense
counsel for "purposely lying" about when he had located Wormley,259 then the sins of the defense attorney were visited upon the
defendant. The upshot of this decision was that Taylor's personal
constitutional rights were sacrificed as an atonement for his attorney's allegedly "ethical" violation.
Given the notion advanced by the Court that constitutional
rights are personal and cannot be vicariously asserted,26 it is ironic
indeed that the Taylor Court is willing to circumscribe a vital constitutional trial right of a criminal defendant in part to sanction
defense counsel for a procedural or ethical violation. Indeed, as
Justice Brennan remarks, such alternatives as the imposition of
fines, or the threat of incarceration or disciplinary proceedings, are
far more effective in deterring attorney misconduct than the exclu261
sionary remedy.
In fact, the dissent in Taylor could have marshalled another effective argument to counter the majority's approval of the exclusionary sanction for defense counsel's discovery violation. The
Court in United States v. Leon 26 2 gave its approval to the "goodfaith" exception to the exclusionary rule.2"' The majority's rationale centered on the assumption that a police officer who secured a
search warrant in "good faith" reliance of its validity would not be
deterred by the exclusionary sanction. The same argument could
be applied to Taylor. That is, why should the defendant be penalized by the exclusionary sanction from presenting critical, probative exculpatory evidence when he acts in good-faith reliance on
his counsel's representation? Further, if one accepts Leon's rationale, why impose the exclusionary remedy when the likelihood of
deterrence is minimal, if not illusory?
Furthermore, the Court recently held in Arizona v. Youngblood2 6 4 that the good-faith rationale should apply when the government loses or destroys potentially useful evidence in good faith.
In fact, the interesting aspect of Youngblood is that the Court em259. Id. at 664.
260. This, of course, is the concept of "standing" to assert a constitutional violation.
See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (standing explained as it relates to the fourth
amendment); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (standing concept employed as to
fourth amendment applied by analogy to the sixth amendment).
261. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 665 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
262. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
263. Id. at 921.
264. 109 S.Ct. 333 (1988), reh'g denied, 109 S.Ct. 885 (1988).
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ploys Valenzuela-Bernal to bolster its holding that "unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure
to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial
of Due Process of law."2 65 The Court clearly proposes a doublestandard in which good-faith may be asserted by the prosecution
to rebut a due-process claim by the defendant, but the defendant
may not reciprocate by resorting to a good-faith argument in attempting to preserve a vital trial-related constitutional right.
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion, therefore, is not only more
consistent with precedent but also is grounded on a strong logical
foundation. His position, briefly stated, is that if the defendant
does not participate in the discovery violation, the exclusionary
sanction is "arbitrary and disproportionate to the purposes of
discovery, and criminal justice and should be per se
26 6
unconstitutional."
6.

Taylor and the Criminal Justice System:
An Assessment

The majority opinion in Taylor has distressing implications for
criminal defendants as well as for the criminal process in general.
It seems that the Court is willing to apply severe sanctions to the
defense but is not as receptive to the idea as far as the prosecution
is concerned. The Court's "misgivings" about the application of
the exclusionary rule to prevent the prosecution from introducing
otherwise admissible, probative evidence did not concern the majority in Taylor.267 More important, the Court's application of the
exclusionary rule in Taylor alters the balance of power in a criminal trial by in effect facilitating the prosecution's task in obtaining
a conviction.
The prosecution's advantage in Taylor may be readily discerned
by examining the dynamics of the case and, in particular, the effect
of the discovery rule at issue in the case. One may readily conclude
that the discovery rule Taylor's counsel contravened clearly favored the prosecution. This proposition is supported by Justice
265. Id. at 337.
266. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 658, 667.
267. Justice Brennan did notice this irony by stating in his dissenting opinion that "It
seems particularly ironic that the Court should approve the exclusion of evidence in this
case when several of its members have expressed serious misgivings about the evidentiary
costs of exclusionary rules in other contexts." Id. at 667. See Part IV infra for an elaboration of this argument.
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Douglas' prescient concurring opinion in Wardius v. Oregon.2 6 In
that opinion, Justice Douglas maintained that the guarantees accorded criminal defendants in the Bill of Rights do not contemplate an "adversary proceeding between two equal parties."2" 9
Rather, these rights are designed to rectify the prosecution's enormous advantage in terms of investigation and other resourses visa-vis the criminal defendant.2 70
Viewed from this perpective, the reciprocal discovery rule at issue in Taylor 271 does not seem as neutral as it appears at first
glance. By allowing the prosecution to discover the names and addresses of witnesses the defendant intends to call at trial and any
statements made by the witnesses, the rule gives the government
an insight into the defense's case. Therefore, the prosecution not
only enjoys its inherent investigative advantage over the defendant
but also gets a glimpse of the defendant's possible strategy at trial.
Further, the reciprocal discovery rule in Taylor was not intended
to prevent the last-minute fabricated testimony that notice-of-alibi
rules supposedly guard against.
The exclusion of Wormley's testimony, moreover, diminished the
prosecution's burden to establish Taylor's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship 272 establishes the prosecution's burden of
proof and delineates the fundamental tenet that our criminal adversary process prefers a wrongful acquittal over a mistaken conviction.2 73 Furthermore, in Cool v. United States274 the Court invalidated an instruction to the effect that an accomplice's
testimony should be disregarded unless the jury believed that it
was true beyond a reasonable doubt because the instruction reduced the government's burden of proof.275 The Court in Cool
reached this conclusion on the ground that the instruction created
"an artificial barrier" to the weighing by the jury of relevant, material exculpatory evidence.2 76
268. 412 U.S. 470, 480 (Douglas, J., concurring). See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of Douglas' opinion.
269. Wardius, 412 U.S. at 480 (Douglas, J. concurring).
270. Id.
271. See supra note 171 for the text of the rule.
272. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
273. Id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan stated that: "[T]he requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case. . . [is] bottomed on a fundamental value determination in our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man
than to let a guilty man go free." Id.
274. 409 U.S. 100 (1972).
275. See notes 53-59 and accompanying text for an extended analysis of Cool.
276. Cool, 409 U.S. at 104.
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In Taylor, of course, the jury did not have the opportunity of
hearing Wormley's material, exculpatory evidence linking the alleged victim's brother to the gun that injured the victim. This evidence could have created reasonable doubt in the jurors' minds
and therefore led to an acquittal or, possibly, to a hung jury. The
trial court's exclusion of Wormley's testimony, however, precluded
the defendant from planting the seed of doubt in the jury's mind
and thereby facilitated the prosecution's burden of proving guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Taylor decision represents the crowning triumph of the
"sporting theory" of justice. The ruling exalts procedure over substance to unparalleled heights. The Court engages in "doublespeak" when it quotes United States v. Nixon for the proposition
that the ends of justice are ill-served if "judgments were to be7
21' 7
founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts.
By denying the defendant the right to present a "complete" defense, the Taylor Court permitted his conviction to rest on an incomplete presentation of the facts. In an effort to rigidly preserve
the "sanctity of discovery, ' 17 8 the Court upheld Taylor's conviction
"in the interest of fair play. '279 The Court's attempt to achieve
"fairness" in the criminal justice process produced an eminently
"unjust" result for Ray Taylor and for the criminal justice system.
IV.

INTEGRITY, RELIABILITY, AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE: ARE
THEY REALLY THAT IMPORTANT TO THE SUPREME COURT?

Paradoxically, the Taylor Court's ratification of the exclusionary
remedy in Taylor is at odds with the Court's recent antipathy toward the exclusionary rule. In fact, Justice Brennan expresses this
contradiction in his dissenting opinion in Taylor.2 8 Justice Brennan's analysis of this dichotomy, however, is rather conclusory.
This section, therefore, will elaborate upon the dissent's exposition
of this contradiction in light of the Court's devaluation of the exclusionary remedy as applied to the prosecution and will examine
the enigmatic stress on integrity and reliability by the Taylor
Court in light of the Court's recent depreciation of those values.
277. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 652 (quoting from United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709
(1974)).
278. This is the apt phrase used by Justice Brennan in his dissent. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at
667 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
279. This language is taken from Pound's address to the A.B.A. See, supra Part I,
note 3.
280. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 667 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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The Exclusionary Rule and Taylor

The Supreme Court's hostility toward the effects of the exclu28 1
sionary remedy reached its apogee in United States v. Leon.
Leon was previously analyzed in the context of its relationship to
the Taylor Court's imposition of the exclusionary remedy as a
sanction for defense counsel's discovery violation.28 2 It is necessary
to revisit Leon, however, in order to apply it in a broader context.
Of course, in Leon the Court fashioned the "good-faith" exception
to the exclusionary rule. In broad terms, Leon stands for the proposition that in circumstances wherein police officers obtain a
search warrant in "good faith" and the warrant is subsequently invalidated because it was issued without probable cause, the exclusionary rule will not be applied.28 3 The policy rationale of the majority centered on the argument that the cost of suppressing such
evidence far outweighed its benefits, since the deterrence objective
underlying the exclusionary remedy would not be served when police officers obtain a warrant in the objectively reasonable "good
faith" belief that is valid.
If the Taylor Court would have adhered to the reasoning upon
which Leon is grounded, it would not have suppressed Wormley's
testimony. Weighing the "costs" and "benefits" of exclusion in
Taylor yields the unequivocal conclusion that the costs of excluding Wormley's testimony superseded the benefits derived from
suppression. The costs of suppression were substantial: the exclusion of material, relevant evidence that exculpated the defendant
and that might have swayed the jury by creating reasonable doubt.
By contrast, the benefits of excluding Wormley's testimony pale in
comparison with the costs. If the Court was seeking general deterrence of future discovery violations by defense counsel, it is unlikely that the suppression of Wormley's testimony had its desired
effect. Defense counsel did not suffer any punitive sanctions for
the violation; rather, Taylor paid the "costs" of his counsel's transgression through the exclusion of Wormley's testimony.
If the Taylor Court's concern with the integrity of the criminal
process and the reliability of testimony is the focus of its decision,
as this Article maintains, the benefits again fall short of the costs
exacted by exclusion. Quite simply, the primary cost of suppression
281. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). The companion case to Leon is Massachusetts v. Sheppard,
468 U.S. 981 (1984).
282. See supra notes 262-63 and accompanying text.
283. Leon, 468 U.S. at 920-21.
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was significant: the jury that convicted Taylor was barred from
hearing testimony that would have had an effect on the determination of guilt. The worst case scenario of this suppression is that,
because of the delay in discovery, "an innocent man may be serving ten years in prison. "284 The benefits, on the other hand, are
minimal at best, nonexistent at worst. Apart from the Court's
deviation from precedent, even if it believed that trial court was
correct in keeping perjured or presumptively perjured testimony
from the jury, the net effect of its ruling was to insult the intelligence of the jurors, who had the option of rejecting Wormley's
testimony.
B.

Integrity, the Exclusionary Rule, and Taylor

Not only is the Taylor Court's deprecation of its own doctrine
regarding the exclusionary rule contradictory, but it also is rather
baffling that the key reasoning of Taylor rests on the integrity rationale. Indeed, the Court weighs the right of the defendant to
compulsory process against the "integrity of the adversary process"
and finds that integrity is more important than compulsory process.2 85 By contrast, the Court has abandoned integrity as a rationale for the exclusionary rule.
As previously mentioned,2 86 the principal objective of the exclusionary rule is deterrence of police misconduct. However, another
compelling rationale of the exclusionary rule is "the imperative of
judicial integrity. 2 8 7 Of course, the "imperative of judicial integrity" is predicated on the notion that courts condone the violation
of the Constitution by admitting evidence that is tainted because it
was illegally obtained. The erosion of the integrity rationale as
support for the exclusionary rule, however, is unmistakable. It began with United States v. Calandra28 s and has continued unabated, to the point that the Court has completely dispensed with
28
integrity as a basis for the rule. 1
284. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 667 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 655.
286. See part I supra.
287. This rationale was first expressed by the Court in Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206 (1960).
288. 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (the majority focused solely on the deterrence rationale in
holding that a grand jury witness may not refuse to answer questions because they are based
on illegally seized evidence).
289. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). For an argument that the
principal goal of the exclusionary rule is to maintain judicial integrity rather than to deter
police illegality, see, e.g., Baldwin, Due Process and the Exclusionary Rule: Integrity and
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In light of this eradication of the integrity rationale as a basis for
the exclusionary rule, it is ironic that the Taylor decision relies so
heavily on integrity to exclude the testimony of a witness who was
willing to offer material, relevant evidence helpful to the defendant. One can only explain this manifest inconsistency by assuming
that integrity is important to the Court when it adversely affects
the defendant but is irrelevant when integrity might detract from
the government's ability to secure a conviction.
C.

Reliability, Connelly, and Taylor

The integrity of the adversary system, the majority in Taylor
insists, "depends . . on the presentation of reliable evidence and
the rejection of unreliable evidence."28 0 What is truly remarkable
291
about this statement is that the Court in Colorado v. Connelly
rejected out of.hand the notion that reliability was worthy of constitutional concern or protection under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.29 2 The Connelly Court held that, absent coercion by the police, the confession of an insane defendant
is "voluntary" and hence admissible into evidence and does not
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.29 3
More important, the Connelly Court emphasized the considerable costs exacted by the exclusionary rule and cited the deterrence
rationale as the sole basis for the rule. 94 It is instructive, moreover, to juxtapose the Connelly Court's statement that it had "previously cautioned against expanding 'currently applicable exclusionary rules by erecting additional barriers to placing truthful and
probative evidence before state juries,"2 95 with the Taylor decision.
The "truthful and probative" evidence the Court in Connelly
declared constitutionally admissible into evidence was the confession of a defendant who suffered from chronic schizophrenia at the
time he confessed. 296 The Connelly Court readily acknowledged
that such a confession might be less than "reliable." Nonetheless,
although the Court recognized that Connelly's confession might
"be proved to be quite unreliable," it deemed such an issue not
Justification, 39 U. FLA. L. REv. 505 (1987).

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 655.
479 U.S. 157 (1986).
Id. at 167. For a critique of this position see Garcia, supra note 18, at 280-81.
Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167.
Id. at 166 (citations omitted).
Id. (quoting Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1972)).
Id. at 161-62.
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worthy of constitutional concern and best left to "the evidentiary
laws of the forum." 9 Indeed, the Court went as far as to declare
that, "[t]he aim of the requirement of Due Process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental
298
unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false.
A comparison of the evidence suppressed because of its putative
"unreliability" in Taylor and the confession the Court in Connelly
did not view as constitutionally suspect yields only one conclusion:
reliability is important for the Court as far as the defendant is concerned but is of no consequence with regard to the prosecution.
Wormley's testimony was that of a sane, competent individual who
was subject to cross-examination by the government. Although one
might argue that Wormley's testimony was tainted by its "eleventh-hour" nature, it surely bore as much, if not more, indicia of
reliability as Connelly's confession. In effect, the Court seems to be
comfortable with a double-standard that favors the government
and curtails a criminal defendant's critical trial-related constitutional rights.
V.

CONCLUSION

Is our adversary process of adjudication excessively procedural
and therefore "blind" to justice, as Pound argued in his landmark
address to the American Bar Association over eight decades ago?
The Supreme Court seems to agree with Pound's assessment of our
adjudicatory system, at least insofar as it affects the criminal process and, particularly, to the degree it suppresses material, relevant
evidence sought to be introduced by the prosecution at trial.
In Taylor v. Illinois, however, the Court subscribed to the
"sporting theory" of justice with a vengeance. In the name of "procedural" consistency, the Taylor Court excluded relevant, probative, otherwise admissible exculpatory evidence that could have altered the course of the trial. In the process of doing so, the Court
deprived the defendant of a vital constitutional right deeply embedded in our jurisprudence: the right of the defendant to compulsory process for obtaining and presenting witnesses in her favor.
It is a sad commentary on the jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court that a state supreme court has shed more wisdom on the
issue of the extent to which discovery rules should interfere with a
defendant's right to compulsory process than the Taylor Court's
297.
298.

Id. at 167 (citations omitted).
Id (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941)).
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flawed analysis of the matter. In Houston v. State,29 9 the Mississippi Supreme Court eloquently described the function of a criminal trial as a "trial for life and liberty [and] not a game."30 0 The
court put discovery rules in perspective by classifying them as "not
an end in themselves but a means to the end that we dare call
justice." 30 1 More important, the court adhered to the principle first
enunciated in Washington v. Texas, °2 that procedural and, specifically, discovery rules ought to be applied with a view toward the
fact-finder, whether judge or jury, receiving all "relevant and otherwise admissible" evidence. 30 3
The decision of the Court in Taylor represents the ultimate glorification of the "sporting theory" which a majority of the Court
has decried on many occasions. Procedural rigidity, however,
seemed to suit the purposes of the Taylor Court because the aggrieved party was the defendant, not the government. In essence,
the Taylor Court "evened" the score by reversing the trend begun
in Washington that stressed substantive justice and eschewed
strict procedural conformity.

299.
300.
301.

531 So.2d 598 ( Miss. 1988).
Id. at 611.
Id.

302.

388 U.S. 14 (1967).

303.

Houston, 531 So.2d at 611.

